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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L ts a t i s f i ed w i t h Mo unteer's statement ui i 
UP&L believes the sol*3 i-<^ M- : 
.^1*111*" '" . spondeat superior 
•_ . c: w u w i - • •- ] \ ~ employee for injuries mtenti : 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
..-^wiied with Mounteer's statement of the case 
whic. UP&L asserts is -is follows: 
°ercy Mounteer "I I'll u u i t M ' r f
 IP ar employee -if "tot ->w<-
,ui -inj-a I , sued UP&L * i.ir -« - personal nij . • 
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 ; ler, t: :nf I lotion ~ • — - J- *-opens t-
*'^ r~ ' u i sm i ss ' - . : . : 
..,'^ wi ; r;.- 'ui- , , .:earino \r< . e 
the motion was under advisement, Mounteer filed a motion to amend 
the complaint, together with a proposed amended complaint, R. 
103; R. 41. On August 17, 1987, The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
by a minute entry, granted UP&L's motion without prejudice, R. 
107. On August 21, 1987, the trial court, sua sponte, struck as 
moot the motion to amend the complaint. 
At the time the action was dismissed, Mounteer in his 
pleadings had presented to the Court the provable state of facts. 
The fatal defects identified in those pleadings were precisely 
those allegsitions which the judge ordered be incorporated into 
the order of dismissal. Order upon Plaintiff's Objections, R. 
123; Order and Judgment of Dismissal, R. 125. 
The following allegations in the complaint comprised the 
factual support for Mounteerfs causes of action. 
1. At all times relevant to the causes of action alleged, 
Larsen was a UP&L employee and was acting in the course and scope 
of her employment. Complaint 5 3, R. 2. 
2. At all times relevant to the causes of action alleged, 
Mounteer was a UP&L employee and was acting in the course and 
scope of his employment. Complaint 55 4, 5 and 7, R. 3, 4. 
3. Larsen was instructed by UP&L to "investigate" the 
plaintiff for drug use. UP&L had specific policies for such an 
investigation. Complaint 55 7 and 16, R. 4, 5. 
4. Larsen!s conduct about which Mounteer complains was in 
violation of UP&L policy. Complaint 55 7 and 16, R. 4, 5. 
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5. Larsen's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent, 
malicious, outrageous, and reckless. Complaint J5 17, 19 and 21, 
R. 5, 6. 
6. Larsen knowingly made false, defamatory statements 
about Mounteer. Complaint ff 7 and 8, R. 4. 
7. Even after being advised that her communication was 
being broadcast broadly and not to a particular supervisor, 
"Larsen persisted and continued to make [false] allegations to 
the effect that plaintiff was on drugs." Complaint 3 7, R. 4. 
8. Mounteer alleges UP&L is liable solely as Larsenfs 
principle. Amended Complaint f 18, R. 45. 
9. Mounteer concedes that under no state of facts can it 
be proven that UP&L intended or directed Larsen to commit the 
intentional torts about which he complains. Transcript of July 
31, 1987, hearing upon motion to dismiss, p. 15, line 9-16; 
23-24, R. 164; p. 16, line 10-12, R. 165; p. 18, line 13-20, R. 
167. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Mounteer alleges he was personally injured when a 
co-employee knowingly and intentionally made false and defamatory 
statements about him. Larsenfs conduct is categorized by the 
context in which the plaintiff pleads it, as intentionally 
tortious conduct. 
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2. As a matter of law, unless the employer directs its 
employee to engage in tortious activity or intends the injurious 
act, the employer is not liable for injuries its employee suffers 
at the hands of a co-employee. 
3. Larsen's conduct deviated from the purpose of serving 
her employer when she knowingly communicated false and defamatory 
statements about Mounteer to her fellow employees. This was not 
contemplated by Larsen's authority to act for UP&L. 
4. Reference by the court in its order upon a motion to 
dismiss to the fatally defective state of facts alleged by 
Mounteer was required and is not the impermissible finding of 
facts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION ARE FOR INTENTIONAL 
TORTIOUS ACTS. 
Mounteerfs argument to this Court hinges upon the removal of 
Larsen's defamatory statements from the intentional tort catego-
ry, thereby avoiding the holdings of Bryan v. Utah Intern'tl, 533 
P. 2d 892 (Utah 1975) and the seminal Utah Supreme Court opinion 
upon an employer's liability for the intentional torts of its em-
ployee—Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 139 P. 2d 878 
(1943). 
The state of facts alleged by Mounteer are that Larsen's 
acts were intentional, grossly negligent, malicious, outrageous, 
and reckless and that she knowingly defamed him. Complaint H 
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17, 19 and 21, R. 5, 6; Amended Complaint SI 17, 20 and 22, R. 
44, 45. He even alleges that Larsen persisted in the outrageous 
conduct after being informed that her defamatory statements were 
being broadcast to a wide audience. Complaint 5 7, R. 4; Amended 
Complaint, $ 7, R. 43. Mounteer has always alleged that Larsen's 
conduct was in violation of the policies of her employer, and 
therefor that it deviated from her authority and the interests of 
the employer. Complaint f 7 and 16, R. 4, 5. 
Mounteer1s second cause of action, for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, must be based upon this Court's 
opinion in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). 
The Court defined this cause of action as intentional conduct 
having a purpose of inflicting emotional distress or which any 
reasonable person would know will inflict emotional distress, 
i.e. intentionally harmful conduct. To state a cause of action, 
the conduct must be intolerable and offensive against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 358 P. 2d 
at 347. Both of Mounteerfs causes of action are based upon the 
same conduct, which must be categorized as intentionally tor-
tious. 
II. AN EMPLOYER IS NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL OF RESPONDEAT 
SUPERIOR ALONE LIABLE TO AN EMPLOYEE FOR INJURIES INTENTIONALLY 
INFLICTED BY A CO-EMPLOYEE. 
Bryan v. Utah Intern1 tl., 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) clearly 
holds that unless the employer intended the particular harm or 
directed the commission of the tort, as a matter of law the 
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employer is not liable for the injuries that result to the 
employee. Mounteer has not and does not now allege any such 
intent or direction by UP&L. 
Stating that Bryan only applies to an assault, Appellant's 
Brieff p. 14f unreasonably limits its holding. Bryan reflects 
the reality of the work place and the fact that employees do not 
always conduct themselves as the employer wishes. At times 
employees may deviate from their duties and engage in intentional 
injurious conduct of many forms. Unless the employer intended or 
directed this deviation, to the employer the injury caused is 
"one more industrial mishap in the factory," for which the 
employer is not liable. Larson, Workmenf s Compensation Law, § 
68.21 at 13-74. 
Mounteer tries to distinguish his case from Bryan by stating 
that in Bryan the intentional conduct "was totally non-related to 
the employment." Appellant's Brief, p. 15. However, the facts 
in Bryan were that while performing the assigned job of pulling a 
cable which was required if Bryan was to perform his job, the 
offending employee intentionally and maliciously pulled the cable 
so as to strike Bryan. The act of pulling the cable was certain-
ly to serve the employer's interest. The circumstances which 
gave rise to the tortious acts were certainly related to the 
employment of both Bryan and the tortfeasor. But the reckless 
manner in which the cable was moved was not directed or intended 
by the employer. Even though both employees were within the 
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course and scope of their employment, the employer as a matter of 
law was not liable for the injuries suffered by Bryan. 
The trial court correctly recognized the similarities of 
Mounteer's case to Bryan. See Transcript p. 15, line 5-12, R. 
164? p. 16, line 17-23, R. 165; p. 18, line 13-18, R. 167; p. 19, 
line 9-14, R. 168; p. 14, line 5-15, R. 173. Larsen was sent to 
"investigate the plaintiff for drug use." In violation of UP&L 
policy, Larsen engaged in intentional and malicious acts which 
UP&L neither directed nor intended. Mounteer was injured, but 
UP&L is not liable. Any state of facts which Mounteer could 
prove does not change this result. 
III. UP&L IS NOT LIABLE FOR LARSEN1S ACTS BECAUSE THEY WERE 
NOT IN FURTHERANCE OF UP&LfS INTERESTS. 
Barney v. Jewel Tea Co., 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878 (1943) 
held: 
We believe the better rule to be that a 
principle is not liable for the willful tort 
of an agent which is committed during the 
course of his employment unless it is commit-
ted in the furtherance of his employer's 
interests or unless the employment is such 
that the use of force could be contemplated 
in its accomplishment. 139 P.2d at 879. 
Inherent in the causes of action alleged by Mounteer is 
excessive and outrageous conduct without responsibility or 
reason. Such conduct, as a matter of law, is not actuated by the 
intent of performing the business of the employer. See Lunn v, 
Boyd, 403 Pa. 231, 169 A.2d 103 (1961). 
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In Barney an employee of Jewel Tea Company was responsible 
for delivering groceries and collecting payments. In the process 
of performing these duties he committed battery upon a woman who 
refused to make payment on her account. This activity on its 
face did not further the employer's interest since the employee 
failed to collect on the account and alienated the customer. 
Even though the employee was entrusted with collecting money owed 
to his employer, the use of physical force was not contemplated 
for the performance of the employee of those duties. 
Barney also suggests that if there is an acceptable means of 
serving the employer's interest, then accomplishing the employ-
er's objective by inappropriate measures is conduct for which the 
employer is not liable. 139 P.2d at 880. Larsen was assigned to 
investigate Mounteer for illegal drug usage and was expected to 
comply with company policy on the subject, the acceptable means 
of furthering UP&L's interests. The assignment did not contem-
plate intentional and malicious defamation or intentionally 
inflicting emotional distress rendering Mounteer incapable of 
continued employment. 
While Larsen was assigned the duty of investigating 
Mounteer, UP&L could not have reasonably anticipated that Larsen 
would knowingly violate company policy by making false and 
defamatory statements indiscriminately throughout the work place. 
Also, it was not expected that after learning of what she was 
doing, that she would persist in the same intentional and 
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outrageous conduct. Complaint f 7, R. 4; Amended Complaint, \ 7, 
R. 43. 
Mounteer's citation to Comments C and E to Restatement of 
Agency 2d, § 247, does not change the conclusion that Larsen was 
not serving the interests of UP&L. Comment C addresses the 
employee who is retained for the specific purpose of speaking for 
the employer. Larsen was not employed to speak for UP&L. 
Comment E addresses the conduct of a person "managing a busi-
ness." Larsen was not a manager vested with discretion in the 
performance of her duties. In fact, Mounteer acknowledges that a 
policy was in place governing Larsen's duties and that she 
violated those policies. Complaint JI 7, 9, R. 4. Larsen was 
not given carte blanche authority to proceed as she saw fit and 
the only provable state of facts is that she intentionally 
deviated from her authority. 
Mounteer also cites Restatement of Agency 2d, § 231, Comment 
B, which correctly states that an employer will be liable for 
conduct of the employee "it is natural to expect that servants 
may do." The provable state of facts is that Larsen's conduct 
was far in excess of what any employer would naturally expect an 
employee to do. 
Mounteer's citing of Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), also does not alter the accuracy of the 
trial court's analysis of his causes of action. In Phillips the 
basis of the broker's liability was based upon a direct relation 
-9-
to the injured party and the fact that the principle played an 
independent material role in the harmful transaction. 666 P. 2d 
at 882-883. 
Mounteer also urges this Court to hold that Larsen's subjec-
tive belief that she was serving her employer's interests deter-
mines the employer's liability. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. But if 
the tortfeasor employee's reasons for acting is the determining 
factor, then in Bryan if the tortfeasor had wanted to expedite 
the moving of the cable and did so in an intentional injurious 
manner, Utah International would be liable for his assault, a 
patently erroneous result. 
The issue is not Larsen's reasons for her conduct but 
whether knowingly making false defamatory statements about 
Mounteer to his co-employees was contemplated by UP&L for the 
performance by Larsen of her duties. It is obvious that"defaming 
anyone and intentionally inflicting emotional distress was not 
and could not have been contemplated as part of Larsen's duties. 
It is ludicrous to suggest that UP&L's interest could in any way 
be furthered by Larsen defaming Mounteer or by inflicting him 
with emotional distress through conduct which offends generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality, rendering Mounteer 
permanently and totally disabled from employment. Complaint 3 
11, R. 4; Amended Complaint f 11, R. 44. 
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IV. THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL PROPERLY CITES THE LEGAL DEFECTS 
OF THE ACTION. 
The Order and Judgment of Dismissal, R. 125, appropriately 
outlines why under any state of facts which may be proven, the 
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may 
be granted. The trial court was required by U.R.C.P. 52(a) to 
"issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision," 
because UP&L's motion to dismiss was based upon U.R.C.P. 12(b) 
and the motion was based on more than one ground. 
The minute entry upon which the Order is based, R. 107, does 
no more than (1) accurately set forth the law applicable to the 
case, i.e. that the employer must intend or direct the injurious 
conduct, (2) and sets forth the state of facts relied upon by the 
plaintiff in support of his claim, i.e. that Larsen deviated from 
her assigned duties and authority which UP&L neither intended nor 
directed and by committing an intentional tort, injured Mounteer. 
Under any state of facts which could be proven, as exem-
plified by the two statements in the complaint and amended 
complaint, UP&L neither intended nor directed Larsen to engage in 
the injurious conduct. Proof of such intent or direction was an 
elemental part of Mounteerfs causes of action and as this was the 
only state of facts which could be proven in support of the 
claim, as a matter of law, Mounteer failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted. 
It is particularly telling that even after the July 31, 
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1987, hearing during which the defects in the complaint were 
discussed by the Court and Mounteer's counsel, an amended 
complaint was prepared which made no attempt to allege the 
intention or direction which is required by Bryan v. Utah 
Intern1tl. if UP&L is to become liable. 
Finally, neither Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission 
Service, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970), nor any other 
opinion which has addressed a motion to dismiss, prohibits the 
court from stating why the cause of action fails. 
CONCLUSION 
UP&L respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Order 
and Judgment of Dismissal in its entirety, including the dismiss-
al without prejudice. UP&L further prays for an award of its 
costs incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /8" day of February 19 88. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
Its Attorney 
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